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THE MOSAIC THEORY
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Orin S. Kerr*
In the Supreme Court's recent decision on GPS surveillance, United States
v. Jones, five justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied
a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before
Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions had always evaluated each step of an
investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a "mosaic
theory" of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective
sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider
whether the sequence amounts to a search.
This Article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment. It explores the choices and puzzles that a mosaic theory
would raise, and it analyzes the merits of the proposed new method of
Fourth Amendment analysis. The Article makes three major points. First,
the mosaic theory represents a dramatic departure from the basic building
block of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Second, adopting the mosaic
theory would require courts to answer a long list of novel and challenging
questions. Third, courts should reject the theory and retain the traditional
sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. The mosaic approach
reflects legitimate concerns, but implementing it would be exceedingly dif-
ficult in light of rapid technological change. Courts can better respond to
the concerns animating the mosaic theory within the traditional parame-
ters of the sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,'
and the most challenging and important threshold question in interpreting
the Fourth Amendment is what counts as a "search."2 Identifying Fourth
Amendment searches traditionally has required analyzing police action se-
quentially.3 If no individual step in a sequence counts as a search, then the
Fourth Amendment is not triggered. No Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The issue of what counts as a seizure is comparatively simple, and it therefore has
received little scholarly attention. Seizures require governmental assertion of control, so a
seizure of property occurs when the government meaningfully interferes with a person's pos-
sessory interest. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
3. See infra Section I.A.
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In United States v. Maynard,4 the D.C. Circuit introduced a different ap-
proach, which could be called a "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment.'
Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence
of steps rather than as individual steps. 6 Identifying Fourth Amendment
searches requires analyzing police actions over time as a collective "mosaic"
of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a collective Fourth Amendment
search even though the individual steps taken in isolation do not.7 The D.C.
Circuit applied that test in Maynard to GPS surveillance of a car. The court
held that GPS surveillance of a car's location over twenty-eight days aggre-
gates into so much surveillance that the collective sequence triggers Fourth
Amendment protection.
8
When the Supreme Court reviewed Maynard in United States v. Jones,9
concurring opinions signed or joined by five of the justices endorsed some
form of the D.C. Circuit's mosaic theory. 10 The majority opinion resolved
the case without reaching the mosaic theory, and neither concurring opinion
gave the issue extensive analysis. But Justice Alito's concurring opinion for
four justices clearly echoed the basic reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in con-
cluding that long-term GPS monitoring of a car counts as a search even
though short-term monitoring does not.'I Justice Sotomayor's separate con-
currence also voiced support for the mosaic approach.'
2
The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a
five-justice majority of the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic
theory of Fourth Amendment protection. That prospect invites lower courts
to consider whether the mosaic theory is viable and if so, how it should be
applied. A handful of courts have begun to do so in the short time since the
Court handed down Jones, with mixed results so far. 3 Law enforcement is
4. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
5. I first used this label in a blog post published on the day the Maynard decision was
handed down. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" of Fourth Amendment,
Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010,
2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-
amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/. Other labels are possible, but
for the sake of consistency I will adhere to that term.
6. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 n.*.
7. Id. at 566.
8. Id. at 561-62.
9. 132 S. Ct. 945.
10. See infra Section I.C.
11. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito's
opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.
12. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (reasoning that determining whether govern-
ment behavior constitutes a search requires considering "whether people reasonably expect
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated" in such a manner).
13. Compare United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (rejecting
the mosaic theory for collection of cell-site data), with Mont. State Fund v. Simms, 270 P.3d
64, 69-72 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (suggesting that the mosaic theory
should apply to public camera surveillance).
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paying close attention as well. Soon after Jones, the General Counsel of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation informed a law school audience that the
mosaic opinions in Jones were causing significant turmoil inside the FBI.
14
The mosaic opinions in Jones implicate fundamental questions about the
future of Fourth Amendment law. What might a mosaic theory mean? What
challenges does it entail? Should lower courts eagerly adopt such a method,
or do its risks outweigh its benefits? And when the mosaic theory eventually
works its way back up to the Supreme Court, should the Court embrace it as
a valid theory or reject it as misguided?
This Article considers the consequences of possible judicial adoption of
a mosaic theory. It maps out the possible futures of the mosaic theory, and it
details how the theory raises questions that courts will need to answer. 5 It
also evaluates the merits of the mosaic approach and considers whether
judges should accept the invitation to adopt it.
The Article makes three points. First, the mosaic theory is a major de-
parture from the traditional mode of Fourth Amendment analysis. The
current structure of Fourth Amendment doctrine hinges on what I call a "se-
quential approach." The sequential approach takes a snapshot of each
discrete step and assesses whether that discrete step at that discrete time
constitutes a search. This analytical method forms the foundation of existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine, ranging from the threshold question of what
the Fourth Amendment regulates to considerations of constitutional reason-
ableness and remedies. By aggregating conduct rather than looking to
discrete steps, the mosaic theory offers a fundamental challenge to current
Fourth Amendment law.
Second, implementing the mosaic theory would require courts to answer
an extensive list of difficult and novel questions. Severing the Fourth
Amendment from the sequential approach would compel courts to start
afresh with a new building block of Fourth Amendment analysis. For exam-
ple, what is the standard for the mosaic? How should courts aggregate
conduct to know when a sufficient mosaic has been created? Which tech-
niques should fall within the mosaic approach? Should mosaic searches
require a warrant? If so, how can mosaic warrants satisfy the particularity
requirement? Should the exclusionary rule apply to violations of the mosaic
search doctrine? Who has standing to challenge mosaic searches? Adopting
14. See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off 3,000
Tracking Devices, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-
ruling-prompts-fbi-turn-off-3-154046722--abc-news.html.
15. A few student notes and online journal articles have touched on the mosaic theory
in the wake of Maynard, although none have addressed its operation and merits in detail. Ex-
amples include Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use
of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable
Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 201 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/1017.pdf; Erin Smith Dennis, Note, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment,
and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (2011); Justin P. Webb, Note,
Car-ving Out Notions of Privacy: The Impact of GPS Tracking and Why Maynard Is a Move in
the Right Direction, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 751 (2011-12).
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a mosaic theory would require courts to answer all of these questions and
more.
Third, as a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory. The
mosaic approach is animated by legitimate concerns: it aims to maintain the
balance of Fourth Amendment protection as technology changes, a method I
have elsewhere called "equilibrium-adjustment."' 6 But it aims to achieve this
reasonable goal in a peculiar way. By rejecting the building block of the
sequential approach, the mosaic theory would be very difficult to administer
coherently. Even if courts could develop answers to the many questions the
theory raises, doing so would take many years-by which time the technol-
ogies regulated by the theory would become obsolete. The mosaic theory
would also deter enactment of statutory privacy regulations and force judges
to consider questions that they are poorly equipped to answer. If courts must
broaden Fourth Amendment rules in response to new technologies, the bet-
ter approach is to rule that certain steps are always searches. The model
should be the Supreme Court's famous decision in Katz v. United States, 7
not the concurring opinions in Jones.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the sequential ap-
proach that forms the basis for existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Part 11
provides a close analysis of the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court decisions
on the mosaic theory in Maynard and Jones. Part III catalogs and considers
the many difficult issues that courts would need to answer to implement the
mosaic theory. Finally, Part IV argues that courts should reject the mosaic
theory and retain the traditional sequential approach to interpreting the
Fourth Amendment.
I. THE SEQUENTIAL APPROACH TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Section explains how the sequential approach to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis forms the building block of modem Fourth Amendment
doctrine. It begins by introducing the sequential approach and then exam-
ines the three basic stages of Fourth Amendment analysis: first, what is a
search; second, when is a search unreasonable and therefore unconstitution-
al; and third, when does an unconstitutional search justify a remedy.
A. Sequential Analysis in Search and Seizure Law
Fourth Amendment analysis traditionally has followed what I call the se-
quential approach: to analyze whether government action constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure, courts take a snapshot of the act and assess it in
isolation. The "step-by-step analysis is inherent" 18 in evaluating Fourth
Amendment claims. This does not mean that searches or seizures happen
16. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REv. 476 (2011).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 70-71 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom.
Champagne v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1025 (2005) (mem.).
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instantaneously. An officer might search a home for a few hours and then
seize evidence found inside for the duration of the investigation. But analyz-
ing whether a search has occurred requires a frame-by-frame dissection of
the scene. As the Supreme Court has explained, courts focus on each "par-
ticular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security,"' 19 starting
with the "initial" step and then separately analyzing the "subsequent"
steps.2"
Consider a few examples. If an officer inserts a key into the door of a
residence and then opens the door to enter, a reviewing court will first con-
sider the act of inserting the key and then analyze the distinct act of opening
the door.21 If an officer sees expensive stereo equipment in an apartment,
moves it to see the serial number, and then records the serial number, a court
will treat moving the equipment as distinct from recording the number.
22 If
an officer sees suspects preparing for a robbery, stops them, and pats them
down for weapons, the court will consider the viewing, the stopping, and the
patting down as distinct acts that must be analyzed separately.23 Each step
counts as its own Fourth Amendment event and is evaluated independently
of the others.
The sequential approach is not merely a minor aspect of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Rather, it forms the foundation of existing search and
seizure analysis. The remainder of this Section explains how the basic struc-
ture of existing Fourth Amendment law rests on the sequential approach. It
starts with the threshold question of defining a search, then turns to constitu-
tional reasonableness, and concludes with Fourth Amendment remedies.
B. The Search Inquiry Under the Sequential Approach
The Supreme Court's established methods for identifying when a Fourth
Amendment search occurs reflects the sequential approach. From the 1960s
until the Court's recent Jones case, the search inquiry was governed by the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test introduced in Justice Harlan's famous
concurring opinion in Katz.24 Although the phrase "reasonable expectation of
privacy" is notoriously murky, much of the Supreme Court's case law on the
reasonable expectation of privacy test can be understood as distinguishing
between inside and outside surveillance. Conduct violates a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy when a government actor breaks into a private, enclosed
19. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
20. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973).
21. E.g., United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263,272 (4th Cir. 2008).
22. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,324-25 (1987).
23. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15, 27-30.
24. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979). The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Jones explains that this is not the only test, see 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54
(2012), but proponents of the mosaic theory have rooted it solely in this test.
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space,25 such as a home,26 a car,27 a package,2s or a person's pockets. 9 The
entrance into the private space exposes the contents of the private space, and
the search occurs at the moment of exposure.3" In contrast, conduct does not
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy when it consists of observing the
outside of property,3' observing what has already been exposed to the pub-
lic,3 2 or observing public spaces where anyone may travel.33
The sequential approach forms the basic unit of analysis under this tradi-
tional inquiry. To know if a search has occurred, courts ask if the
government's conduct has crossed the boundary from outside to inside sur-
veillance. So long as the government has stayed outside and acquired no
information about what is inside, no search has occurred.34 A search only
happens when the police learn about what is hidden inside a private space,
whether by squeezing a duffle bag to learn its contents3 5 or aiming a thermal
imaging device at a home to learn its temperature.
3 6
The sequential approach also applies to the trespass test revived in
Jones. Under Jones, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when government
actors trespass onto persons, houses, papers, or effects with intent to obtain
information.3 7 The sequential approach naturally matches this traditional
doctrine. A search occurs at the moment of the trespass, and it lasts for the
period of the trespass. Identifying when a search occurs therefore requires
analyzing the government conduct frame by frame and asking when the
conduct triggers a trespass.
C. Constitutional Reasonableness Under the Sequential Approach
The sequential approach also forms a basic part of the next inquiry:
whether searches are constitutionally reasonable. Over time, the Supreme
25. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
26. Id.
27. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807-09, 823-25 (1982).
28. E.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
29. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993).
30. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) ("[W]e have never held that
potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.... It is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the
Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.").
31. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986).
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that "objects, activities, or statements" that a person "exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders"
do not receive Fourth Amendment protection).
33. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
35. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336-37 (2000).
36. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
37. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,951 n.5 (2012).
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Court has offered two different approaches to the reasonableness of
searches. In the middle of the twentieth century, the Court generally indi-
cated that searches are reasonable only when the government obtains a
valid warrant or a special exception to the warrant requirement applies.38
More recently, the Court has suggested a different approach. Reasonable-
ness now is understood as requiring a balancing of interests: courts
consider whether the government interests advanced by the use of an in-
vestigatory technique outweigh the privacy interests that its use
threatens.3 9 Under this approach, reasonableness may require a warrant but
may require less regulation or even no regulation at all.n°
Both approaches to reasonableness rest on the assumption that searches
are readily identifiable acts that occur over readily identifiable periods of
time.4 1 This allows courts to balance the interests for specific kinds of
searches and create categories for when different searches are reasonable. A
few examples demonstrate the point. Under existing Supreme Court prece-
dent, searching a home ordinarily requires a warrant.42 In contrast, searching
a car implicates a different balancing of interests and leads to a different
38. E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("Over and again this Court
has emphasized that the mandate of the Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes.
Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,' may an exemption lie,
and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948))).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) ("We must balance the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.").
40. For example, the Court in Samson v. California explained the balancing approach as
follows:
"[U]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach" we "examin[e] the totality of the
circumstances" to determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Whether a search is reasonable "is determined by assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)).
41. It is true that searches and seizures both occur over a period of time, and the rea-
sonableness inquiry must be made over that period of time. For example, if an officer enters a
home and searches for one hour while a second officer detains the homeowner for two hours,
the search will occur for one hour while the seizure will last for two hours. But the fact that
searches and seizures occur over time does not mean that they reject the sequential approach
or implicate a "mosaic." Their existence and duration are clear as they occur, and do not re-
quire the ex post aggregation and analysis of non-searches.
42. In United States v. Karo, the Court stated as follows:
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individ-
ual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant,
and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our
cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle. Searches and sei-
zures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances.
468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
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rule: because cars are less private than homes, searching a car requires prob-
able cause but no warrant.4 3 A pat-down frisk for weapons implicates yet
another balancing. The need to protect officers' safety alters the balance so
that the police need only specific and articulable facts that a person is armed
and dangerous in order to conduct the frisk.
44
Special rules apply in special circumstances as well. For example, the
government's need to protect the federal border enables federal agents to
routinely search a person and his property at the border or its functional
equivalent.45 The need to stop terror attacks allows the Transportation Secu-
rity Administration ("TSA") to screen individuals and their property at the
airport without suspicion.46 On the other hand, particularly intrusive search-
es receive heightened protection. For example, the police cannot search a
person's body to retrieve evidence if that intrusion might threaten the per-
son's health, even if they have a warrant. 47 In each of these cases, the
analysis presupposes that a search is a readily identifiable act that allows
courts to analyze the strength of the interests in play when the government
commits that kind of act.
The sequential approach also forms the foundation for the warrant re-
quirement. The purpose of the warrant requirement is to ban unlimited
searches that allow investigators to go anywhere and search for any kind of
evidence.48 To curb this abuse, the Warrant Clause includes a particularity
requirement: warrants must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."49 The particularity requirement lim-
its searches by requiring them to occur in a particular place and to look for
specific evidence, such as a search of 123 Main Street for marijuana."' Here
the sequential approach has obvious force: the particularity requirement
rests on the premise that searches are identifiable acts that occur in identifia-
ble places to find identifiable evidence.
D. Constitutional Remedies Under the Sequential Approach
Fourth Amendment law also reflects a sequential method of analysis at
the remedies stage. Consider the causation principles generally required for
Fourth Amendment liability. Remedies apply only if the unconstitutional act
caused the discovery of a specific piece of evidence.5 Establishing causa-
tion requires examining two questions. First, was the unconstitutional act a
43. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1985).
44. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,31 (1968).
45. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004).
46. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, t0-II
(D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 653 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2011).
47. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
48. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84.
51. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590-94 (2006).
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"but for" cause of the discovery of the evidence? Second, was the unconsti-
tutional act a proximate cause of the discovery of the evidence? In the
context of the exclusionary rule, the "but for" causation test consists of the
"inevitable discovery" and "independent source" doctrines. The proximate
cause inquiry takes the form of the colorfully labeled "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine.52 Similar concepts govern remedies in the context of civil
damages, although courts use the traditional labels of causation analysis.
53
This causal analysis is naturally tailored to the sequential approach. De-
ciding whether an influence caused a particular result requires a specific
definition of the influence. Identifying whether a particular fact counts as a
proximate cause of a result requires identifying the specific fact, which then
permits an evaluation of how much that fact contributed to the result. The
same is true with the Fourth Amendment's standing inquiry, which requires
the defendant who seeks relief to show that his own rights were violated.
54
Establishing standing generally requires pointing to a particular act in a par-
ticular time and place that counts as a search. Courts can then determine if
the movant had a sufficient connection to the place searched at that time to
establish standing.5
II. MAYNARD/JONES AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MOSAIC THEORY
The mosaic theory poses a fundamental challenge to the sequential ap-
proach. The theory first arose in a recent case, United States v. Maynard,56
later reviewed by the Supreme Court under the name United States v.
Jones.7 The mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment
search doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in
isolated steps. Instead of asking if a particular act is a search, the mosaic
theory asks whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount
to a search when considered as a group. The mosaic theory is therefore
premised on aggregation: it considers whether a set of nonsearches aggre-
gated together amount to a search because their collection and subsequent
analysis creates a revealing mosaic.
Understanding the new mosaic theory must begin with a close study of
Maynard/Jones at both the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court levels. A close
reading of Maynard/Jones suggests that five justices are ready to embrace the
new mosaic approach to the Fourth Amendment: Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
52. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).
53. In the civil setting, courts have used similar concepts but under traditional causation
labels such as intervening causes and events that break the chain of causation. See, e.g., Hector
v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2000).
54. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978). Although Rakas warns that the
label "standing" is inaccurate, it remains a convenient and widely used shorthand.
55. See id.
56. 615 E3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
57. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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Alito, Kagan, and Sotomayor18 The next Section analyzes Maynard/Jones
with an eye toward understanding how the analysis in Maynard/Jones shifted
the framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment searches from the sequen-
tial approach to the mosaic theory. It then considers what the mosaic theory
might mean for the future of Fourth Amendment law.
A. The Facts of Maynard/Jones
Antoine Jones owned a nightclub in Washington, D.C.59 Lawrence
Maynard served as the nightclub's manager.6° In 2004, a joint federal and
local narcotics task force began to suspect Jones and Maynard of orchestrat-
ing a massive conspiracy to sell cocaine and crack. 61 A complex two-year
investigation followed and ultimately led to the discovery of 97 kilograms of
cocaine, 1 kilogram of crack, and $850,000 in cash in a stash house run by
Jones and Maynard.
62
Investigators used a wide range of techniques to develop the case against
Jones and Maynard. They obtained wiretap orders and pen register orders to
monitor the suspects' telephones, 63 and they relied on informants to share
tips about the conspiracy. 64 They also installed a camera at the front door of
the nightclub to watch who entered and left.65 Additionally, investigators
obtained search warrants to collect copies of text messages shared among
the suspects.
66
The investigators also used a range of techniques to identify the targets'
location. Sophisticated drug dealers generally structure their conspiracies to
keep higher-level members away from the contraband.67 That way, if the
police swoop in, they will find and arrest only low-level dealers who are
easy to replace. 68 As leaders of the conspiracy, Jones and Maynard stayed as
far away from the drugs as possible. Investigators therefore used three dif-
ferent methods to monitor the physical location of both Jones and Maynard to
try to tie them to the conspiracy. The first method of identifying the location
58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 956 (So-
tomayor, J., concurring).
59. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49.
63. United States v. Jones, 451 F Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 E3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
64. Id.
65. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
66. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 74.





of Jones and Maynard was very traditional: the investigators put Jones and
Maynard under visual surveillance.69
The second method was more sophisticated. The police knew Jones's
cell phone number. Cell phones work by connecting to local cell towers,
which route communications. Because cell phone providers routinely keep
records of which towers were used by each account, the government can
obtain cell phone records that act as a rough kind of location device. Most
people carry their phones: the location of a suspect's phone tells the police
the location of the suspect. In Maynard/Jones, investigators applied for
and obtained court orders requiring Jones's cellular provider to provide
cell tower information (called "cell-site" data) for Jones's phone.70 The
government obtained several court orders pursuant to the Stored Commu-
nications Act7' and collected four months' worth of records logging the
location of the phone. The government did not seek admission of this evi-
dence at trial, however.
72
The appellate decisions in MaynardJones focused on the third method
of location monitoring: use of a GPS device installed on Jones's car. Jones
drove a Jeep Grand Cherokee that belonged to his wife.73 Officers obtained a
warrant from a judge in the District of Columbia authorizing them to install
a GPS device on the car.7 4 At the time, no legal authority indicated that a
warrant was necessary. Although precedents were sparse, and the D.C.
courts had not spoken on the issue, other federal courts had ruled that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply in such circumstances.75 The agents ob-
tained a warrant nonetheless, perhaps recognizing that the Supreme Court
had not yet settled the issue.76 Having proceeded cautiously in light of legal
uncertainty, however, the agents then blundered in executing the warrant.
The warrant required officers to install the device inside the District of Co-
lumbia within ten days of the warrant's issuance. The agents did not install
the GPS device until the eleventh day when the car happened to be at a pub-
lic parking lot in Maryland.77
69. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
70. See Defendant's Motion to Suppress Cell Site Data & Memorandum of Points &
Authorities in Support Thereof at 1-3, United States v. Jones, No. 05-CR-386(l) (ESH)
(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Defendant's Motion to Suppress], available at
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/jones-gps.pdf.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (permitting noncontent records from cellular
phones to be obtained based on an application establishing specific and articulable facts).
72. Following the Supreme Court ruling, however, the prosecution is presently attempt-
ing to retry Jones in the district court using the cell-site data. See Defendant's Motion to
Suppress, supra note 70, at 4.
73. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999), abro-
gated by Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
76. Cf People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that placement
and use of a GPS device on a car is a "search" under the New York State constitution).
77. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
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The officers used the GPS device to record the location of Jones's car for
twenty-eight days. The battery-powered GPS device could record the loca-
tion of the car within approximately 50 to 100 feet.78 Whenever the car was
in motion, the GPS device used cell phone technology to broadcast signals
of the car's location to a government computer every seven seconds. The
device produced over 2,000 pages of location data over twenty-eight days.
The location information helped show that Jones's movements were coordi-
nated with those of his co-conspirators, and that he would rendezvous with
his co-conspirators and visit the stash house in Fort Washington, Maryland,
where the drugs and cash were later found.
79
At trial, the prosecution attempted to admit the GPS evidence to show
that Jones was involved in the conspiracy. Jones moved to suppress the GPS
evidence. Judge Ellen Huvelle agreed with Jones that any evidence indicat-
ing that the car was inside Jones's garage had been obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.80 However, Judge Huvelle concluded that the re-
maining GPS evidence was admissible under United States v. Knotts.s1
Knotts had permitted the use of a radio beeper located in a car that broad-
casted the car's location to the police nearby. According to the Supreme
Court in Knotts, using the radio beeper to follow the location of a car on
public roads did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another. When [the defendant] traveled over the public streets, he voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public
roads onto private property.8"
Judge Huvelle reasoned that the same analysis applied to monitoring us-
ing a GPS device.83 Maynard pled guilty, but Jones went to trial. The jury
convicted Jones in a retrial after the first trial resulted in a hung jury.84
B. The D.C. Circuit's Opinion in Maynard
Maynard and Jones appealed their convictions, although only Jones
challenged the GPS evidence used to convict him at trial. Jones argued on
appeal that Knotts was distinguishable because a GPS device was "light
78. Id.
79. See id. at 948-49.
80. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
81. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
82. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
83. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
84. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49.
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years away"85 from a radio beeper. Far from merely enhancing the senses,
the GPS device could gather so much evidence over time that it could create
a full picture of a person's life. Quoting a law student note published in the
Boston College Law Review,86 Jones argued that GPS monitoring was so
intrusive, even in public, that it resembled an invasive search:
Even though one may expect fleeting glances in public, and police should
not have to avert their eyes from what they can see in public, one does not
thereby expect the targeted aggregation of data a GPS device collects on
one's movements, particularly a kind of surveillance the individual can
neither detect nor prevent.8 7
The D.C. Circuit affirmed Maynard's conviction but reversed Jones's
conviction on the ground that use of the GPS device over twenty-eight days
was a Fourth Amendment search. 88 Judge Douglas Ginsburg reasoned that
Knotts was inapplicable because Knotts had suggested that "dragnet-type
law enforcement practices" might trigger "different constitutional princi-
ples. ' 89 They did, Judge Ginsburg reasoned, and installing and monitoring a
GPS device was one such dragnet-type practice. Knotts therefore did not
control.
Once freed from Knotts, Judge Ginsburg turned to the "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" inquiry. Judge Ginsburg relied on a string of cases
applying what I have elsewhere called the probabilistic model of Fourth
Amendment protection.90 Under these cases, whether government conduct
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy depends in significant part on
the likelihood that evidence will be exposed to the public.91 In Judge Gins-
burg's view, these cases indicated that the core question raised by GPS
monitoring was the likelihood that the information collected by GPS moni-
toring was exposed to the public.92
Judge Ginsburg's answer to this question redefined the basic unit of
Fourth Amendment law. Instead of looking at the likelihood that discrete
pieces of GPS information would be exposed to the public, Judge Ginsburg
considered whether the entirety of the GPS monitoring over the course of
twenty-eight days, considered as a collective whole, would be so exposed.
85. See Brief for Appellants at 54, United States v. Maynard, 615 F3d 544 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 08-3030), 2009 WL 3155141.
86. April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court's Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46
B.C. L. REV. 661 (2005).
87. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 85, at 60 (quoting Otterberg, supra note 86, at
696-97).
88. United States v. Maynard, 615 F3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Unit-
ed States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
89. Id. at 556-58 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983)).
90. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 508-12 (2007).
91. Id.
92. Maynard, 615 F3d at 558.
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In his view, the monitoring over time constituted a "search" because it was
extremely unlikely that the public would actually observe the entirety of
such movements.93 Members of the public would surely see discrete parts of
Jones's movements considered in isolation. But it was essentially impossible
for any one person to observe the complete set:
[T]he whole of a person's movements over the course of a month is not ac-
tually exposed to the public because the likelihood a stranger would
observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil. It is
one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a
single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work. It is
another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent again the next
day and the day after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he
has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that make up
that person's hitherto private routine.94
Judge Ginsburg acknowledged that the discrete readings of the GPS de-
vice revealed information exposed to the public. But he reasoned that even if
each of the individual readings were exposed in a constructive sense-that
is, exposed even if no one actually observed them-the collective entity of
the twenty-eight days of surveillance was not so exposed. This was true be-
cause the collective sum of twenty-eight days of surveillance revealed more
than the sum of its parts. "The difference is not one of degree but of kind,"
Judge Ginsburg wrote, "for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns
that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life, nor the
departure from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock
Holmes story, may reveal even more."95 Many nonsearches packaged to-
gether as a collective entity became a search because the individual pieces
of the puzzle that seemed small in isolation could be assembled together like
a mosaic to reveal the full picture of a person's life.
For precedent, Judge Ginsburg turned to a Freedom of Information Act
case, U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press.96 Reporters Committee held that the FBI had properly refused to dis-
close "rap sheets" listing the criminal convictions of individuals under an
exception to FOIA that applies when the disclosure could reasonably be
expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy.97 Although individual
acts reported on the rap sheets were already public, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that bringing the information together for easy access made a major
difference: "Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized sum-
mary located in a single clearinghouse of information."98
93. Id.
94. Id. at 560.
95. Id. at 562.
96. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
97. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 779-80.
98. Id. at 764.
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Judge Ginsburg argued that the same mosaic principle should apply in
the Fourth Amendment setting. The whole was not merely the sum of its
parts:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-
term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not
do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal
more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Re-
peated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by
any single visit, as does one's not visiting any of these places over the
course of a month. The sequence of a person's movements can reveal still
more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a
different story. A person who knows all of another's travels can deduce
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym,
an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an asso-
ciate of particular individuals or political groups-and not just one such
fact about a person, but all such facts.99
When considered as a collective whole, the monitoring over twenty-
eight days was a Fourth Amendment search because it revealed "an intimate
picture of the subject's life that he expects no one to have-short perhaps of
his spouse."1 ° The D.C. Circuit denied rehearing over several dissents, in-
cluding one by Judge Kavanaugh that pointed to an alternative rationale:
perhaps the installation of the device, rather than its use, constituted the
search.10
C. The Supreme Court's Opinions in Jones
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Jones had been the subject
of a Fourth Amendment search but divided sharply on why.'02 Writing for a
five-justice majority, Justice Scalia followed Judge Kavanaugh's suggestion
and held that the installation of the GPS device was a search because it was
a trespass on the "effects" of the car.0 3 Having resolved the case on trespass
grounds, Justice Scalia did not need to reach the mosaic theory adopted in
the D.C. Circuit.' °4 However, five justices wrote or joined opinions that did
touch on the mosaic theory. Their opinions are somewhat cryptic, but they
suggest that a majority of the Court is ready to embrace some form of the
D.C. Circuit's mosaic theory.
The first opinion to consider is Justice Alito's concurrence in the judg-
ment. Justice Alito wrote for four justices, as his opinion was joined by
99. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
100. Id. at 563.
101. See United States v. Jones, 625 E3d 766, 769-71 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting), denying reh'g en banc to United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.
2010), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
102. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
103. Id. at 951-54.
104. Id. at 953-54.
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Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. 10 Most of Justice Alito's opinion
criticized the majority's trespass rationale. 106 Near the end, however, his
opinion turned to how he would have resolved the case under the reasonable
expectation of privacy test 0 7 Justice Alito accepted United States v. Knotts
but construed it as limited to "relatively short-term monitoring of a person's
movements."'0 8 According to Justice Alito, the long-term monitoring of the
car presented a different issue.'0 9
Justice Alito applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test by invok-
ing expectations of how law enforcement investigate particular crimes.
According to Justice Alito, society has an expectation as to how different
offenses might be investigated. For most offenses, "society's expectation has
been that law enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in the
main, could not" 10 monitor the location of the suspect's car in the detailed
way GPS monitoring enabled. The same might not be true of an "extraordi-
nary offense[],"' I Justice Alito suggested. For "extraordinary" crimes, such
extensive monitoring might be expected based on "previously available
techniques."'1 2 But because the conspiracy in Jones was not, in Justice
Alito's view, "extraordinary," the degree of observation implicated by long-
term monitoring exceeded society's expectations and therefore constituted a
Fourth Amendment search.
Justice Alito's analysis is cryptic, in part because this section of his
opinion cites no authority. At the same time, his opinion echoes the D.C.
Circuit's mosaic approach in Maynard. Like the D.C. Circuit, Justice Alito
concluded that long-term GPS monitoring constituted a search while
short-term monitoring did not."3 More broadly, by shifting the probabilis-
tic inquiry from what a person might expect the public to see to what a
person might expect the police to do, Justice Alito introduced the element of
time, which is critical to the mosaic approach. Justice Alito analyzed the
constitutionality of the monitoring in Jones by asking if the entirety of the
monitoring over twenty-eight days exceeded societal expectations. Implicit-
ly, the unit of the search was a collective whole over an extended period of
time.
The fifth justice to touch on the mosaic theory was Justice Sotomayor.
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion and also agreed with Justice
Alito that use of a GPS device constituted a search, independent of its instal-
lation. Justice Sotomayor reasoned that "the unique attributes of GPS
105. Id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. Id. at 958-62.
107. Id. at 963-64.








monitoring"' 4-its precision, detail, and efficiency-should guide the con-
stitutional analysis of its use:
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when consid-
ering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the
sum of one's public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their politi-
cal and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. 
5
This passage clearly echoes the mosaic theory. Justice Sotomayor
focuses on whether a person has Fourth Amendment rights "in the sum" of
their public movements, rather than in individual movements. Second,
Justice Sotomayor asks whether people reasonably expect that their
movements not only will be recorded but also "aggregated." This is the
language of sums from the mosaic theory, not the language of individual
acts from the sequential approach.
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor's version of the mosaic theory suggests a
different standard than that adopted by Justice Alito. Justice Alito's opinion
focused on surprise. It looked to whether the investigation exceeded socie-
ty's expectations for how the police would investigate a particular crime.
1 16
In contrast, Justice Sotomayor's approach looked to whether police conduct
collected so much information that it enabled the government to learn about
a person's private affairs "more or less at will."1"7 Despite these differences,
both of the concurring opinions in Jones analyze the collective sum of gov-
ernment action, rather than individual sequential steps, to determine what
counts as a Fourth Amendment search.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE MOSAIc THEORY
The possible adoption of the mosaic theory raises challenging new ques-
tions for the future of Fourth Amendment law. It is undoubtedly true that
combining many pieces of information about suspects can lead the govern-
ment to learn intimate details about their lives." 8 In the past, however, this
was considered good police work rather than cause for alarm. The repeated
use of nonsearch techniques has been considered an essential way to create
probable cause that justifies searches rather than an unlawful search itself." 9
114. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at956.
116. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
117. See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
118. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 284 (2010) ("As
more and more items of information emerge about a secret plan or policy, outsiders will have
more and more opportunities to draw inferences across the items and to relate them to other
items of information they possess. Such analytic mosaic-making is a basic precept of intelli-
gence gathering, used by our government to learn about our enemies and by our enemies to
learn about us.").
119. Cf. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) ("[T]he Government
cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting evidence
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The very different premises of the mosaic theory open a wide range of new
questions for courts to answer.
This Section analyzes the choices that courts must consider if they de-
cide to adopt a mosaic approach. The lesson of this Section is that
implementing a mosaic theory would require courts to answer a remarkable
set of novel and difficult questions. The theory is so different from what has
come before that implementing it would require the creation of a parallel set
of Fourth Amendment rules. For every settled question of law under the se-
quential approach, courts would need to reanalyze the framework under the
mosaic theory. And, for the most part, the mosaic version would be expo-
nentially more complicated. Under the sequential approach, searches are
simple points. Replacing those points with complex aggregates over space
and time is akin to introducing Flatland's square to a three-dimensional
world.
120
The analysis focuses on four major questions:
1. The Standard Question. The first question concerns the standard that
would govern the mosaic theory. What test determines when a mosaic
has been created? The three pro-mosaic opinions in Maynard/Jones
suggested three different standards, and future courts will have to
choose which standard to adopt. Articulating the standard also requires
determining what stages of surveillance a mosaic search regulates. Is
data collection enough, or is subsequent analysis and use also required?
If the latter, what are the constitutional standards for data analysis and
disclosure?
2. The Grouping Question. If courts adopt a mosaic theory, they will need
a theory of grouping to explain how conduct should be grouped to as-
sess whether the collective whole crosses the mosaic line. The mosaic
theory groups conduct that is not a search and asks if the nonsearches
considered together cross the line to become a search. This requires
courts to answer a series of grouping questions. Which surveillance
methods prompt a mosaic approach? Should courts group across sur-
veillance methods? If so, how? What is the half-life of a mosaic search?
3. Constitutional Reasonableness. The next question is how to analyze the
reasonableness of mosaic searches. Mosaic searches do not fit an obvi-
ous doctrinal box for determining reasonableness. The nature of the
mosaic is that each mosaic will be different, potentially requiring dif-
ferent kinds of reasonableness analyses for each one. This concern is
bolstered by the fact that the mosaic may aggregate across many differ-
ent kinds of surveillance, each of which will raise its own
reasonableness concerns. Courts will therefore have to create a frame-
work for determining the reasonableness of mosaic searches.
4. Remedies for Mosaic Violations. The final question concerns what rem-
edies should apply to unconstitutional mosaic searches. Does the
sufficient to establish probable cause because the very purpose of requesting the information is
to ascertain whether probable cause exists.").
120. EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (5th ed., Har-
per & Row 1963) (1884).
December 2012]
Michigan Law Review
exclusionary rule apply? If so, does the rule extend over all of the mo-
saic or only the surveillance that crossed the line to trigger a search?
Who has standing to challenge mosaic searches? How should courts
apply remedial limitations such as inevitable discovery given that only
parts of the mosaic may have been inevitably discovered? Also, when
should civil remedies be available for mosaic theory violations? Courts
will have to craft a new remedial jurisprudence for the new mosaic
search doctrine.
A. Identifying the Standard
The first challenge raised by the potential adoption of a mosaic theory is
selecting the proper standard for aggregation. This question divides into two
parts. The first requires identifying the proper reference point for when a
mosaic has been created. The second requires choosing which stages of sur-
veillance the mosaic theory regulates: initial data collection, subsequent
analysis, or both.
1. Expectations of What?
The first question raised by the mosaic theory is what kinds of expecta-
tions of privacy the mosaic theory should recognize. The three pro-mosaic
opinions in Maynard/Jones each suggest a different answer. Justice Alito
focused on societal expectations about law enforcement practices. 121 In his
view, a search occurs when investigators collect and analyze evidence in a
way or to a degree that would surprise members of society. 2 2 In contrast,
Justice Sotomayor offered a more normative standard that looked at gov-
ernment power. In her view, a search occurs when the government can learn
details about a person's personal life "more or less at will. ' 123 In the D.C.
Circuit opinion introducing the mosaic theory, Judge Ginsburg offered yet
another standard, focusing on whether the government learned more than a
stranger could have observed. These approaches are quite different. If courts
adopt the mosaic theory, which version should they use?
Choosing among the different versions of the mosaic theory is particu-
larly difficult because each formulation contains major ambiguities.
Consider Justice Alito's approach, which focuses on societal beliefs about
police powers.I24 Applying Alito's standard requires courts first to identify
what a reasonable person thinks about existing police investigations and
then to identify when an investigation exceeds that expectation in some
measured way. This is a difficult task. Objective standards are used widely
within Fourth Amendment law. But most people lack direct experience with
police investigations. As a result, they have little basis on which to estimate
what is common or uncommon about particular investigations. Even among
121. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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experienced officers, reasonable estimates will diverge. Different agencies
investigate different cases in different circumstances in different ways.
Given the public's poor understanding of police practices and the wide
variation among those practices, it is unclear what courts are supposed to
measure or how they are supposed to measure it. 2 ' Nor is it clear what kind
of deviations from that expectation can trigger the mosaic. Investigations
can involve many people using many tools over time. Any reasonably com-
petent defense attorney can find at least some aspect of an investigation that
might surprise a member of the public in some way. Implementing Justice
Alito's approach therefore requires courts to develop a theory of which de-
viations matter and how much.
Justice Sotomayor's approach is even more ambiguous than Justice
Alito's. According to Justice Sotomayor, courts must ask "whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."' 26 If taken literally,
this language appears to direct courts to first identify a threshold of "more or
less at will" for how easily the government can "record and aggregate" in-
formation about a person's "political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and
so on." Courts must then determine whether the public has the reasonable
expectations that this will occur. But what does this mean? Phrases like "and
so on" and "more or less at will" do not identify legal standards as much as
make suggestions for further inquiry. Adopting Justice Sotomayor's standard
would require significant elaboration.
Ambiguities remain if courts use Judge Ginsburg's standard and look to
the likelihood that private actors would conduct similar surveillance. What
do courts know about the kinds of surveillance practices that businesses,
marketers, and private investigators might conduct? How similar is similar
enough? Is the relevant standard whether the aggregation of evidence ex-
ceeds societal expectations of what one single stranger would see, or what
all strangers collectively would see? Adopting Judge Ginsburg's standard
would require courts to answer such questions.
2. The Stages of Surveillance
The next question is what stages of surveillance the mosaic theory would
regulate. Surveillance regimes often involve several stages: first, the acquisi-
tion of information; second, the analysis of that information; and third, the use
or disclosure of that information. 27 Fourth Amendment law traditionally has
focused only on the first step-the acquisition of information. 2I The
125. I develop this point further infra in Section IV.B.2.
126. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
127. Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law 4-5 (Brookings
Inst. The Future of the Constitution Series, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/research/files/papers/2011/4/19%20surveillance%201aws%20kerr/0419_surveillance law
_kerr.pdf.
128. Id. at 6, 9-10.
December 2012]
Michigan Law Review
subsequent analysis and use of information has been considered beyond the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection. 2 9
The mosaic theory could change this. Justice Alito's opinion in Jones
looked to whether a person reasonably expects others to "secretly monitor
and catalog"130 a person's movements. Justice Sotomayor asked "whether
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggre-
gated"'' in a manner that creates the mosaic. Cataloging and aggregating
are verbs that describe subsequent analysis instead of initial collection.
These phrases suggest that the mosaic theory requires some step beyond the
acquisition stage.
If so, courts will need to determine what kinds of postacquisition con-
duct are required to create a mosaic. Imagine the government collects a
great deal of information but never combines it into a single database. Has a
mosaic been created? Or imagine the evidence is collected into a database
but never analyzed. Does that cross the line? If some analysis of the evi-
dence is required to trigger the mosaic, what kind of analysis counts? Does
any analysis suffice, or is there some threshold of sophistication or computa-
tional complexity before the mosaic line has been crossed?
Identifying the precise stage regulated by the mosaic theory is particu-
larly important in light of the requirement of state action in Fourth
Amendment law. The Fourth Amendment only applies to conduct by the
government or its agents. 3 2 If private parties conduct surveillance, that sur-
veillance cannot constitute a Fourth Amendment search unless the parties
acted as agents of the government. 13 3 The state action requirement raises
difficult questions because government agents and private parties can divide
surveillance tasks. To see the problem, imagine that a private party collects
mosaic data without government involvement. Now imagine that the gov-
ernment obtains a court order compelling the private party to disclose it, or
that the private party voluntarily discloses the records to the government.
Government investigators then analyze the data and use it to identify a sus-
pect's whereabouts or conduct. Does the Fourth Amendment apply if a private
party created the data and the government only analyzed it? And what if the
roles are reversed, and the government collects the data that is then analyzed
by a private party? Does the Fourth Amendment apply to the collection
without analysis? Shifting from a sequential approach to a mosaic theory
129. This is true for two reasons. First, if the information collected is not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection, then its analysis raises no Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g.,
State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 797 (N.J. 2008) (holding that searching through a database of
criminal records is not a Fourth Amendment "search" because the criminal records are matters
of public record). Second, even if the information collected was once subject to Fourth
Amendment protection, the initial search of that information eliminates a subsequent expecta-
tion of privacy. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("[O]nce police are lawfully
in a position to observe an item firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost.").
130. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
132. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984).
133. See id.
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requires identifying exactly which steps in the mosaic require government
action to trigger Fourth Amendment protections.
B. The Grouping Problem: Developing a Theory of
Aggregation for the Mosaic Search
After courts settle on a standard to gauge if a mosaic has been created,
the next question is how to solve the grouping problem. The mosaic theory
looks at an aggregated set of data acquisitions, and it determines when they
trigger a collective search. Applying this approach requires a theory of
grouping-a theory of what should be aggregated and how-to assess when
that trigger point has been reached. Three kinds of questions must be con-
sidered: first, duration and how to measure scale; second, which surveillance
methods count; and third, how and whether to group across different inves-
tigations.
1. Duration and Scale
The first initial grouping question is the most obvious: how long must
the tool be used before the relevant mosaic is created? In Jones, the GPS
device was installed for twenty-eight days. Justice Alito stated that this was
"surely"'134 long enough to create a mosaic. But he provided no reason why,
and he recognized that "other cases may present more difficult questions."'1
35
If twenty-eight days is too far, how about fourteen days? Or 3.6 days?
Where is the line?
Identifying the length of time only scratches the surface of the problem.
Modem technological tools such as GPS devices can be programmed to rec-
ord at any interval. The ability to program surveillance tools greatly
complicates legal standards based on time. To appreciate this, imagine the
police use a GPS device that is programmed to turn on and record the loca-
tion of the car for only one hour a day. The device is otherwise dormant. If
the police monitor that device over twenty-eight days, does that count as
twenty-eight days of monitoring? Or is that only twenty-eight hours of mon-
itoring?
Software can be configured to collect data in more complex ways, fur-
ther complicating the problem. Imagine the GPS device is set to record the
location of the car only once a month, precisely at midnight on the first day
of each month. If the police install the device and use it for one month, they
will have only one data point. Should this count as one month of location
monitoring? Or is it only a single observation? In the language of Justice
Alito's opinion, is this "long-term" surveillance that triggers a search or
"short-term" surveillance that does not? What if the device records once a
day or once a week instead of only once a month?
134. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("We need not iden-
tify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line




A related question is whether delay makes a difference. Does a mosaic
have a half-life, such that the portion of an earlier mosaic fades over time
and restarts the mosaic clock? Assume, for the sake of argument, that the
Supreme Court eventually draws the line for continuous GPS monitoring at
seven days. When the monitoring has occurred for seven days, a search has
occurred. Now imagine that the police monitor a suspect for five days and
then give up and remove the GPS device. A few years later, the police de-
cide to reopen the case, and they install another GPS device and use it for
three days. Does this count as eight days of monitoring, such that the mosaic
was created and the conduct was a search? Or does this count as five days of
monitoring in one year and three days of monitoring a few years later, nei-
ther of which is a search?136
The counting problem is exacerbated by the fact that different suspects
will act differently at different times. The amount of private information
collected by the surveillance will vary greatly from suspect to suspect. For
example, imagine the police know that one suspect rarely uses his car while
a second suspect drives several hours a day. The police install GPS devices
on both cars for one week, revealing very little about the first suspect and a
great deal about the habits of the second. Does the mosaic amount to a
search earlier for the second suspect than for the first? Or do the days of
monitoring accumulate in the same way regardless of how the car is used?
Does it matter if the police know these differences before the monitoring
occurs? Courts will have to decide whether these differences matter, and if
so, if they matter independently of police knowledge or if some police
knowledge is required.
2. Which Surveillance Methods Count?
The next set of questions considers which surveillance methods trigger
the mosaic theory and whether and how to group across different methods.
The facts of Maynard/Jones are illustrative. In MaynardJones, GPS surveil-
lance was only one tool among many that investigators used. The
government obtained cell phone location records, installed a public surveil-
lance camera, and watched the suspects in public, all in addition to tapping
phones and obtaining text messages.'37 When considering whether conduct
amounts to a mosaic, which of these different tools are subject to the mosaic
inquiry?
Consider a few examples, starting with surveillance methods that monitor
location. Should the mosaic theory apply to obtaining records for cell-site
location transmitted from the suspect's phone to the suspect's service provid-
136. An additional complication is that a group of coconspirators can share a group of
cars, and each car can have a surveillance device installed for different periods of time. See,
e.g., United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *6-7 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (considering mosaic arguments in a case involving a conspiracy of three
narcotics defendants who drove three cars, each of which had a GPS device installed for dif-
ferent periods of time).
137. See supra notes 62-71.
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er?138 Should the theory apply if the government uses a drone (an unmanned
aerial surveillance vehicle) to monitor the location of the suspect's car? Or
cameras that read license plates? If the police send a team of investigators to
place the suspect under visual surveillance, should that visual surveillance
be subject to the same analysis? How about public camera surveillance, such
as that created by closed-circuit television cameras or by government inves-
tigators monitoring suspects in public? 139 Any of these technologies can be
used to identify a suspect's location over time. If courts adopt the mosaic
approach, they will need to answer whether the mosaic theory applies to
these techniques.
The next question is whether the mosaic theory only applies to location
surveillance. The GPS device in Jones broadcast the location of Jones's car,
and the collective record of the location of the car over time allowed the gov-
ernment to assemble a picture of what Jones did during that period. But many
surveillance tools can assemble a picture of a suspect's life without revealing
the person's location. The police might collect records containing every email
address a suspect wrote to and every telephone number a suspect dialed. In-
vestigators might monitor the IP address of every website that a suspect
visited. They might obtain a suspect's credit card statements showing pur-
chases the suspect made over many months. If the mosaic theory applies to
location monitoring, courts will need to consider whether the same theory
extends to other kinds of surveillance.
If the mosaic theory applies to multiple surveillance methods, courts
must also consider whether the duration and scale questions raised earlier
should be answered in the same way for every method. Different methods of
surveillance have different levels of invasiveness. As a result, different
methods of surveillance might require different regulation within the mosaic
framework. If the mosaic approach applies to cell-site surveillance, for ex-
ample, should the required period of surveillance to trigger a search be
longer than the period for GPS surveillance because cell-site surveillance is
less exact and invasive than GPS surveillance? Or should all techniques sub-
ject to a mosaic analysis be treated in the same way?
3. Grouping Across Practices, Officers, and Investigations
If the mosaic approach applies to multiple surveillance practices, the next
question is whether and how to group across them. In Maynard/Jones, the
police simultaneously monitored a suspect using cell-site tracking, visual sur-
veillance, and GPS monitoring. 40 If the mosaic theory applies to each
surveillance method individually, should courts apply the theory to each sur-
veillance method in isolation? Or should they ask whether the collective of
138. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (rejecting
the mosaic theory for collection of cell-site data).
139. See, e.g., Mont. State Fund v. Simms, 270 P.3d 64, 69-72 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J.,
specially concurring) (suggesting that the mosaic theory should apply to public camera sur-
veillance).
140. See supra notes 62-73.
December 20121
Michigan Law Review
some or all of these methods amounts to a search?' If seven days of con-
tinuous GPS monitoring creates a mosaic search, how should courts treat,
say, six days of combined monitoring through GPS together with three days
of cell-site monitoring and one day of visual monitoring? Does that count as
ten days' worth of monitoring, or only six?
Because multiple investigations can target the same suspect, courts may
need to consider whether the mosaic aggregates across different investiga-
tions. Imagine a suspect is under investigation by both federal and state
authorities. After the suspect buys a car that has a GPS device installed on it,
the state investigators turn on the GPS device. They monitor the suspect for
five days and then cease monitoring. A few days later, the federal investiga-
tors monitor the suspect for another five days and then stop. If seven days of
GPS monitoring constitutes a search, whether a search has occurred depends
on whether courts aggregate the days across the two investigations.
142
C. The Constitutional Reasonableness of Mosaic Searches
After courts define the standard for the mosaic theory and develop a the-
ory of grouping, they must next articulate a framework for analyzing the
reasonableness of mosaic searches. Recall that constitutional reasonableness
requires a balancing of interests. Courts weigh the invasiveness of the gov-
ernment conduct against the extent to which it serves legitimate government
interests, and they then determine how much regulation of that step is needed
to ensure its use is constitutionally reasonable.' 41 For some searches, courts
require a warrant based on probable cause.' 44 For other searches, they re-
quire just probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, or even no suspicion at
all?'45 How should this framework apply to mosaic searches? Should mosaic
searches require search warrants, and if so, how should such warrants be
drafted? If warrants are not required, what level of cause must be estab-
lished?
The question is difficult because the reasonableness of searches tradi-
tionally has been tied to the location of the place searched and the
circumstances in which the search occurred. Searches of homes ordinarily
require a warrant. 146 Searches of cars ordinarily require probable cause but
141. These issues did not come up in Maynard/Jones because the government did not
seek admission of the cell-site monitoring, and it seems that the visual surveillance did not
cover the location information revealed by the GPS device and used at trial.
142. Different investigations might represent different governments, different agencies of
the same government, different parts of the same agency, or a mix of these options. They
might know of each other, or they might not.
143. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); United States v. Bailey (In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F3d 341, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2000).
144. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
145. Compare California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1985), with Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
146. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 719.
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no warrant. 47 Limited frisks of persons for weapons require only reasonable
suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous.148 And most of these
searches can be performed with less or even no suspicion in special circum-
stances, ranging from searches of probationers (no suspicion required) 149 to
searches under exigent circumstances (general reasonableness required). 10
Applying these principles to mosaic searches raises novel issues because
mosaic searches target a "place" that has never before been regulated under
the Fourth Amendment. In Maynard/Jones, for example, GPS monitoring
collected information about Jones's public location. The justices agreed that
the government conduct constituted a search, but they did not reach the rea-
sonableness of the search because the question was not litigated below.'5' If
the justices had reached the question, the pro-mosaic justices would have
had to decide a question of first impression: what is the reasonableness of a
search of public space? No court has ever considered the question before
Jones because public-location surveillance has not been considered a
"search."' 52
Several different outcomes seem plausible. Some Fourth Amendment
precedents present the warrant requirement as a default and suggest that a
specific exception must be articulated for another standard to apply.
5 3 If
courts follow those cases, they might conclude that mosaic searches require
a warrant simply because there is no strong reason not to apply a warrant
requirement. 5 4 Courts also might say that mosaic searches require a warrant
because mosaic searches are quite invasive when considered cumulatively or
that the benefit of ex ante judicial review makes a warrant requirement rea-
sonable.
155
On the other hand, other precedents focus more on the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement of reasonableness.' 56 Courts could apply those precedents
147. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-94.
148. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
149. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006).
150. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
151. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,954 (2012).
152. To be sure, in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court did rule that use of a radio
beeper to determine the location of property inside a home requires a warrant. 468 U.S. 705,
714 (1984). But the reason was that the beeper disclosed information about the inside of a
home, which traditionally requires a warrant. See id. at 718-19.
153. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[Slearches conducted out-
side the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.").
154. E.g., State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 499 (S.D. 2012) (suggesting that a warrant is
required for mosaic searches because no exception to the warrant requirement applies).
155. See, e.g., id. ("Because the unfettered use of surveillance technology could funda-
mentally alter the relationship between our government and its citizens, we require oversight
by a neutral magistrate.").
156. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (noting that the "central
requirement" of the Fourth Amendment "is one of reasonableness," which has led the Su-
preme Court to "interpret[] the Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions designed to
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to conclude that mosaic searches are less invasive than home searches and
therefore do not require a warrant. For example, courts might analogize mo-
saic searches to car searches. Just as persons only have a reduced
expectation of privacy in their cars in part because cars are exposed to pub-
lic view, justifying less Fourth Amendment protection for cars than
homes,'57 perhaps persons have only a reduced expectation of privacy in
open spaces that are "searched" by the mosaic.
The reasonableness of mosaic searches becomes particularly compli-
cated if courts conclude that multiple kinds of surveillance practices
trigger the mosaic inquiry. Courts will need to consider if the reasonable-
ness of a mosaic search is a "one-size-fits-all" question or if different
kinds of mosaics implicate different reasonableness standards. For exam-
ple, perhaps GPS mosaic searches are so invasive that they require a
warrant, but cell-site mosaic searches-being less detailed and accurate
than GPS mosaic searches-require only probable cause. Or perhaps mo-
saic searches operate on a graduated scale, requiring less suspicion when
they first trigger the mosaic threshold but then requiring greater suspicion
and a warrant as the surveillance continues.
Courts will next need to answer what kind of probable cause or reasona-
ble suspicion is required. Probable cause and reasonable suspicion represent
levels of probability. But what these standards mean depends on the context.
The question is, probability of what? When the Fourth Amendment requires
probable cause to arrest, for example, the relevant probable cause is proba-
ble cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the suspect
committed it. 158 When the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants,
however, the probable cause requirement refers to probable cause to believe
that evidence or contraband will be found inside the place to be searched. 5 9
The meaning of probable cause depends on the context, with different kinds
of searches and seizures requiring different kinds of probable cause.
This prompts an intriguing question: if mosaic searches require probable
cause, then what kind of probable cause do they require? Must investigators
establish probable cause to believe that the location of the suspect is evi-
dence of a crime? Must they establish probable cause to believe that the
suspect monitored has committed a crime? Or perhaps some other standard
applies?
A recent decision demonstrates the difficulty. 60 Investigators looking for
a fugitive applied for a warrant to collect both GPS and cell-site location
evidence in an effort to locate the fugitive and prosecute him. The govern-
control conduct of law enforcement officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy inter-
ests" that "[s]ometimes... require warrants" and other times do not (quoting Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
157. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1985).
158. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
159. Id. at 307.
160. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location
Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., No. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370 (D. Md. Aug. 3,
2011).
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ment's application established probable cause to believe that the monitoring
would help find the fugitive and that the fugitive was wanted for violations
of federal law. The magistrate judge rejected the government's application
because the government proved the wrong kind of probable cause. In the
magistrate's opinion, the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause that
the evidence sought by the warrant was itself evidence of a crime.161 The
Fourth Amendment did not permit the issuance of a warrant because the
fugitive's current location was not itself evidence of a crime. 62
If courts conclude that mosaic searches require a warrant, they also must
answer how courts can satisfy the particularity requirement of the Warrant
Clause. The Fourth Amendment states that warrants must "particularly de-
scrib[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
' 63
But what is the specific "place" to be searched in a mosaic search? By their
nature, mosaic searches aggregate across many places. The concept of mo-
saic searches draws on the fact that they bring together information from
many places and instances to create a detailed picture of a suspect's life. The
search does not occur in any one place. What is the "place" to be searched?
The world? The court's jurisdiction? Or perhaps the collective places where
the suspect happens to go?
The issue is particularly complex if the mosaic theory regulates beyond
the collection of evidence to include its analysis and use."6 Should the
"place" where the search takes place include where the analysis and use take
place or only where the collection occurs? Similar problems arise with the
requirement of particularly describing the "thing" to be "seized." Mosaic
searches do not seem to "seize" anything. Rather, they collect information
about a person's whereabouts and life. And assuming something is seized
over the course of a mosaic, 165 how can a warrant describe that thing to be
seized with the specificity needed to satisfy the particularity requirement?
The question is difficult because the purpose of the requirement is to ensure
that searches remain narrow: searches must be limited to a single place and
a hunt for specific evidence. 6 6 The theory of mosaic searches flips this un-
derstanding on its head. Mosaic investigations are deemed searches
precisely because they are not limited. Given these difficulties, it is unclear
how or whether courts can reconcile the mosaic search theory and the par-
ticularity requirement.1
7
161. See id. at*27-30.
162. Id. at *30.
163. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
164. See supra Section Il.A.2.
165. Cf United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a war-
rant rule permitting officers to obtain a warrant to seize property authorizes the police to
obtain a sneak-and-peek because entry into a space "seizes" information about what is inside
it).
166. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
167. Courts have encountered somewhat related questions before, although the guidance
in those precedents is only modestly helpful. In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court
suggested that when the police needed to obtain a warrant to use a radio beeper, the place to
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D. Remedies for Mosaic Searches
The final set of questions concerns the scope of remedies for unconstitu-
tional mosaic searches. Three questions must be answered: first, whether the
exclusionary rule should apply to mosaic search violations; second, who has
standing to challenge mosaic searches; and third, the proper scope of the
fruit of the poisonous tree and inevitable discovery doctrines.
1. Does the Exclusionary Rule Apply?
The first significant question is whether mosaic search violations should
trigger the exclusionary rule. Under the exclusionary rule, the government
cannot use at trial evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The scope of the exclusionary rule is complex and currently in a state of
considerable flux. But the scope of the exclusionary rule for mosaic viola-
tions would raise particularly difficult questions.
The first question is whether mosaic violations would be categorically ex-
empt from the exclusionary rule under Hudson v. Michigan.6 ' In Hudson, the
Supreme Court held that the suppression remedy is not available for violations
of the Fourth Amendment "knock-and-announce" rule. 169 The knock-and-
announce rule generally requires agents executing warrants to first knock on
the door and announce their presence, and then wait a "reasonable time" be-
fore entering the place to be searched.170 Hudson concluded that suppression
for knock-and-announce violations was inappropriate because the costs of
the exclusionary rule in that setting outweighed its benefits. The murkiness
of exactly what the "reasonable time" standard requires would trigger end-
less litigation,' 7' and it was likely that the combination of civil remedies and
the training of professional officers would lead to substantial compliance
with the rule even without a suppression remedy.
72
be searched was "the object into which the beeper is to be placed." 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).
This guidance does not answer how particularity applies in the case of the mosaic theory,
however, as the mosaic theory applies to the collection of evidence over time rather than the
installation of a device. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957-58 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Case law on the particularity requirement for roving wiretaps provides another reference
point that is of only limited value. Investigators can obtain roving wiretap orders when sus-
pects frequently change phones; the orders allow the government to monitor phone calls over
whatever telephone facilities the suspects use. Although lower courts have upheld the roving
wiretap authority, e.g., United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1992), roving
wiretaps still state the place to be searched, e.g., id. ("Only telephone facilities actually used
by an identified speaker may be subjected to surveillance .... ). In other words, the place to
be searched is the specific telephone facility where the suspect is placing a phone call. In the
case of a mosaic, in contrast, it is axiomatic that the search cannot occur in a single place.
168. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
169. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599.
170. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 (1995).
171. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594-95,598.
172. See id. at 598-99.
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If courts recognize mosaic searches, they will need to consider whether
mosaic violations are exempt from the exclusionary rule under Hudson. On
one hand, courts might plausibly analogize mosaic search violations to
knock-and-announce violations. Both involve murky standards and would
likely draw significant litigation. To the extent civil remedies and profes-
sionalism ensure that officers comply with the knock-and-announce rule, the
same reasoning might suggest that officers can comply with the mosaic
search rules (whatever they turn out to be). On the other hand, courts could
distinguish mosaic searches on the ground that they are more directly related
to the discovery of evidence. In knock-and-announce cases, the violation and
discovery of evidence generally are unrelated. Failing to knock and announce
does not change the evidence discovered.173 In contrast, if investigators use
tools that create a mosaic of a suspect, at least some parts of the mosaic are
likely to lead to information that could be used in court if it reveals evidence
of crime.
If courts reject Hudson as a basis for denying an exclusionary remedy
for mosaic searches, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule may
nonetheless substantially narrow its application. The Supreme Court's most
recent cases on the good-faith exception indicate that the exclusionary rule
does not apply unless an officer acted culpably. 174 Although the cases are not
a model of clarity, they seem to indicate that the violation must be intention-
al, reckless, or grossly negligent to justify suppression.175 Otherwise, the
violation is one in "good faith" and no exclusionary rule applies.17 6 Depend-
ing on how courts implement the mosaic theory, a plausible argument exists
that the good-faith exception may apply to many types of mosaic searches.
If courts cannot specify ex ante with clarity when police conduct aggregates
sufficiently to constitute a search, officers may understandably cross the line
without personal culpability. Unless the violation is a brazen one, the exclu-
sionary rule might not apply.
Privacy statutes may also limit the scope of the exclusionary rule. Under
Illinois v. Krull,177 the exclusionary rule does not apply if officers reasonably
rely on statutes that authorize their conduct. State laws regulating GPS sur-
veillance may provide a basis for reasonable reliance. 78 To the extent the
scope of the mosaic theory remains unclear, officers who follow statutes
regulating GPS surveillance are likely to avoid suppression even if courts
173. See id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
174. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427-28 (2011).
175. See id. (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009)).
176. See id.
177. 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987).
178. For example, Minnesota Statute sections 626A.35 through 626A.37 require the gov-
ernment to obtain a court order to install a mobile tracking device, and authorize surveillance for
up to sixty days based on proof of "reason to believe that the information likely to be obtained
by the installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626A.37 (West 2009). This appears to be a lower standard than probable cause. See State v.
Fakler, 503 N.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Minn. 1993) (analyzing the "reason to believe" standard in
the Minnesota state surveillance statutes).
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take a more restrictive view of the GPS surveillance than do the relevant
statutes. 179
2. Standing to Challenge Mosaic Searches
If the exclusionary rule generally applies to mosaic search violations,
courts will need to determine its scope. The first challenge is identifying
who has standing to challenge a mosaic search. Fourth Amendment rights
are personal, and individuals can invoke a remedy only if their own rights
have been violated. 180 The Fourth Amendment standing inquiry arises as an
application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Every defendant
must establish that his or her own reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated to merit a ruling suppressing the evidence.
181
Standing raises difficult challenges for the mosaic theory because con-
duct that creates a mosaic may involve monitoring different people at
different times to different degrees. Consider the facts of a recent district
court case, United States v. Luna-Santillanes.182 Three conspirators ran a
heroin trafficking enterprise and shared three cars. Different drivers drove
the three different cars at different times. Investigators installed GPS devices
on all three cars and used the GPS devices to track the movements of the
three defendants. 83 The first car was monitored for two months; the second
car was monitored for what the court called "a few" days; and the third car
was monitored for only two days. 84
Assuming that the collective monitoring of the three cars constituted a
search, who has standing to challenge it? Do all three defendants have
standing because their location was monitored as part of a broader mosaic?
Or must the standing inquiry look to each individual and consider whether
the monitoring of that particular defendant was enough to constitute its own
mosaic? Or perhaps the standing inquiry should operate on a car-by-car ba-
sis, limiting standing to primary drivers or passengers of particular cars?
185
If the exclusionary rule applies to mosaic searches, courts will need to de-
velop answers to these questions.
179. In the short term, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for reliance on
binding appellate precedent might also play a role. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24 (extend-
ing the good-faith exception to reliance on binding appellate precedent). Application of Davis
to mosaic searches is murky, however, as it remains unclear to what extent the discrete-steps
approach factors in reliance on binding precedent. See id.
180. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Fourth
Amendment rights are personal, and when a person objects to the search of a place and in-
vokes the exclusionary rule, he or she must have the requisite connection to that place.").
181. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
182. No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at * 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012).
183. Luna-Santillanes, 2012 WL 1019601, at *1-4.
184. Id. at *7 n.4.
185. Cf United States v. Hanna, No. 11-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 30, 2012) ("For purposes of this analysis under Jones, one must have an expectation of
privacy as to the particular vehicle tracked, either from an ownership or possessory interest.").
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3. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree and Inevitable Discovery
Assuming the exclusionary rule applies and defendants have standing,
the next question is whether the unconstitutional conduct justifies suppres-
sion because it acts as both the but-for and proximate cause of the discovery
of the relevant evidence. In the context of the exclusionary rule, these ques-
tions arise under the rubric of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and
"inevitable discovery" doctrines."' These doctrines raise puzzling questions
for mosaic violations because it is difficult to identify the unconstitutional
mosaic act. Is the aggregated mosaic a single unconstitutional act, or is the
unconstitutional act only the surveillance that occurred after the monitoring
became a search?
Consider whether the exclusionary rule applies to the entire mosaic or
only some part of it. To simplify matters, let's use the prior assumption that
seven days of GPS monitoring crosses the line to become a search. If the
police monitor a GPS device for ten days, must the entire ten days of moni-
toring be suppressed? Or should courts only suppress the last three days of
monitoring data that occurred after the search line was crossed? Further,
imagine the police learn on day two of the ongoing surveillance that the
suspect committed a crime. Should the evidence from day two be sup-
pressed because it was part of the mosaic triggered after seven days, even
though the collection of that evidence was not a search when it occurred? Or
is the evidence from day two an inevitable discovery because it would have
been discovered if the monitoring had stopped before the amount of moni-
toring crossed the mosaic threshold?
A related issue arises when investigators use surveillance to locate tar-
gets at a particular moment rather than to develop a picture of their lives
over time. Consider a recent case involving a GPS device attached to a car
used to transport heroin. 18 7 Investigators used GPS tracking to find the car.
After finding the car, officers conducted a pretextual traffic stop based on a
traffic violation, asked for and obtained consent to search the car, and then
retrieved two kilograms of heroin inside.188 Assuming the GPS device was
used long enough to cross the threshold of a search, should the heroin be
suppressed as a fruit of the poisonous mosaic search? Or does the exclu-
sionary rule not apply because the stop was the product of a short-term use
of the GPS device rather than a broader mosaic? Again, these are difficult
questions that courts will have to answer if they embrace a mosaic theory.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST THE MOSAIC THEORY
The five votes in favor of a mosaic approach in United States v. Jones1 8 9
do not establish the theory as a matter of law. The majority opinion in Jones
186. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
187. Luna-Santillanes, 2012 WL 1019601, at *1-2.
188. See id.
189. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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did not adopt the mosaic approach, and it only touched on the method in
passing to express skepticism. 9 ° Sequential precedents remain binding on
lower courts even if five justices seem prepared to take a new path. For now,
the sequential approach remains the basic standard of Fourth Amendment
doctrine. At the same time, the concurring opinions in Jones invite lower
courts to consider embracing some form of the mosaic approach. Our atten-
tion-therefore must turn to the normative question: Should courts adopt the
mosaic theory? Is the mosaic approach a promising new method of Fourth
Amendment interpretation, or is it a mistake that should be avoided?
This Part argues that courts should reject the mosaic theory. The better
course is to retain the traditional sequential approach to Fourth Amendment
analysis. The mosaic theory aims at a reasonable goal. Changing technology
can outpace the assumptions of existing precedents, and courts may need to
tweak prior doctrine to restore the balance of privacy protection from an
earlier age. I have called this process "equilibrium-adjustment," 191 and it is a
longstanding method of interpreting the Fourth Amendment. But the mosaic
theory aims to achieve this goal in a very peculiar way.
The mosaic theory amounts to an awkward halfway measure. Under the
sequential approach, courts traditionally have two options when deciding
how to regulate police conduct. They can decide that particular conduct is
never a Fourth Amendment search but that legislatures can regulate the con-
duct by enacting statutory protections, or they can say that the conduct is
always a Fourth Amendment search. The mosaic theory offers a vague mid-
dle ground as a third option. The theory allows courts to say that techniques
are sometimes a search. They are not searches when grouped in some ways
(when no mosaic exists) but become searches when grouped in other ways
(when the mosaic line is crossed).
Identifying the principles that should govern this middle ground is ex-
tremely difficult, however, such that the challenges of the method outweigh its
possible benefits. As Part III explained, implementing the mosaic theory raises
a large number of novel and complex questions that courts would need to an-
swer. It is hard to see how courts can answer all these questions coherently.
Even proponents of the mosaic approach appear not to have answers for how
it should apply. 192 Rather than jump headfirst into this morass, the wiser
course is to retain the two options presented under the sequential approach.
This does not mean that courts must allow technology to erode Fourth
Amendment privacy. If courts must expand Fourth Amendment privacy pro-
tections in response to new technologies, they can conclude that the disputed
conduct is always a search under a sequential analysis. The model for this
approach is the most famous Fourth Amendment decision: Katz v. United
190. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (referring to the approach articulated in Justice Alito's
opinion as "thorny," "vexing," and a "novelty" and asking, "What of a 2-day monitoring of a
suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected terror-
ist?").
191. See Kerr, supra note 16.
192. See infra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
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States.193 Katz shows that rejecting the mosaic theory does not mean reject-
ing broad Fourth Amendment protection. It only means rejecting the
awkward halfway measure of the mosaic theory.
A. The Mosaic Theory as Equilibrium-Adjustment
In a recent article, 194 1 argued that much of modem Fourth Amendment
doctrine reflects the principle of equilibrium-adjustment. When technology
and social practice change in ways that substantially threaten the govem-
ment's power to solve crimes, courts often respond by loosening Fourth
Amendment rules to restore the prior level of investigatory power. On the
other hand, when technology and social practice considerably expand gov-
ernment power, courts respond by strengthening Fourth Amendment rules to
attempt to restore the prior level of constitutional protection. Judges inter-
pret the Fourth Amendment in response to major technological changes
much like a driver trying to maintain speed on hilly terrain: they add gas
when climbing uphill but lay off the pedal on the downward slopes.'95
The mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment fits nicely into this frame-
work. Computerization enables extremely fast repetition of surveillance
practices. If a computer can do something, it can do that thing many times in
a split second. Computers also have a previously unimaginable capacity to
aggregate and analyze whatever information investigators collect. The mosa-
ic theory attempts to restore the balance of power by disabling the
government's ability to rely on what computerization enables. As Justice
Alito noted in Jones, surveillance in "the pre-computer age" was necessarily
limited, while computers changed massive-scale monitoring from something
"impractical" to something "relatively easy and cheap."'196 Such new powers
"may 'alter the relationship between citizen and government,"'197 Justice
Sotomayor worried, resulting in "a tool so amenable to misuse"'198 that
Fourth Amendment doctrine needed to respond.
The mosaic theory aims to restore the balance of police power by label-
ing the government's enhanced powers as searches. If investigators use new
tools in modest ways consistent with earlier government capacities, their use
remains outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. But if the gov-
ernment fully exploits the new powers the new tools provide, the scope of
surveillance upsets the earlier balance and the mosaic theory subjects the
government's conduct to Fourth Amendment oversight.
193. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
194. See Kerr, supra note 16.
195. See id. at 487-90 (explaining the process of equilibrium-adjustment).
196. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
197. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640
E3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012)
(mem.)).




B. The Case Against the Mosaic Theory
The critical question is whether the mosaic theory offers a desirable ap-
proach to equilibrium-adjustment. Although the mosaic theory derives from
an admirable goal, I believe it is a troubling approach that courts should reject.
The mosaic theory should be repudiated for three reasons. First, the theory
raises so many novel and puzzling new questions that it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to administer effectively as technology changes. Second, the
mosaic theory rests on a probabilistic conception of the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test that is ill suited to regulate the new technologies that the
mosaic theory has been created to address. And third, the theory interferes
with statutory protections that better regulate surveillance practices outside
of the sequential approach.
1. The Mosaic Theory Would Be Very Difficult to Administer
The first difficulty with the mosaic theory is the most obvious: its im-
plementation raises so many difficult questions that it will prove
exceedingly hard to administer effectively. Because the mosaic theory de-
parts dramatically from existing doctrine, implementing it would require the
creation of a new set of Fourth Amendment rules-in effect, a mosaic paral-
lel to the sequential precedents that exist today. The problem is not only the
number of questions but also their difficulty. Many of the questions raised in
Part III of this Article are genuine puzzles that Fourth Amendment text,
principles, and history cannot readily answer. Judges should be reluctant to
open the legal equivalent of Pandora's Box.
Murky standards are not unknown in Fourth Amendment law, of course.
But the murkiness of the mosaic theory is unprecedented. I find it particular-
ly telling that not even the proponents of the mosaic theory have proposed
answers for how the theory should apply. For example, in one recent article, a
group of scholars who endorsed the mosaic approach dismissed the conceptu-
al difficulties of its implementation on the ground that answering such puzzles
"is why we have judges."199 A pro-mosaic amicus brief in Jones signed by
several prominent legal academics was similarly nonresponsive. 200 The brief
brushed off the difficulties with implementing the mosaic theory by stating
that judges encounter vague standards elsewhere in Fourth Amendment law
and they can implement the mosaic theory by "consider[ing] the same criteria
applied to other surveillance situations.1
20'
I appreciate such confidence in judicial abilities. But surely there is a
stark difference between applying vague standards and implementing a the-
199. See Smith et al., supra note 15, at 201.
200. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Yale Law School Information Society Project Scholars
and Other Experts in the Law of Privacy and Technology in Support of the Respondent at 25-
27, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4614429. The scholars who signed onto
this brief included Daniel Solove, Paul Ohm, Danielle Citron, Christopher Slobogin, Susan
Freiwald, Renee Hutchins, Chris Hoofnagle, and Stephen Henderson. Id. at 1-3.
201. Id. at 27.
[Vol. 111:311
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment
ory so mysterious that Fourth Amendment experts decline to express an
opinion on how to apply it. Judges are smart people, but they are not like
Moses bringing the tablets down from Mount Sinai. If the questions raised
by the mosaic theory can be answered, proponents of the theory should an-
swer them. Expressions of confidence that answers can be found do not
substitute for the answers themselves.
20 2
The challenge of answering the questions raised by the mosaic theory
has particular force because the theory attempts to regulate use of changing
technologies. Law enforcement implementation of new technologies can oc-
cur very quickly, while judicial resolution of difficult constitutional questions
typically occurs at a more snail-like pace. As a result, the constantly evolving
nature of surveillance practices can lead new questions to arise faster than
courts might settle them. Old practices would likely be obsolete by the time
the courts resolved how to address them, and the newest surveillance prac-
tices would arrive and their legality would be unknown. Like Lucy and Ethel
trying to package candy on the ever-faster conveyor belt,203 the mosaic theo-
ry could place judges in the uncomfortable position of trying to settle a wide
range of novel questions for technologies that are changing faster than the
courts can resolve how to regulate them.
Consider the changes in location-identifying technologies in the last
three decades. Thirty years ago, the latest in police location-tracking tech-
nologies was the primitive radio beeper seen in Knotts. But radio beepers
are obsolete. Today the police have new tools at their disposal that were un-
known in the Knotts era, ranging from GPS devices to cell-site records to
license plate cameras. The rapid pace of technological change creates major
difficulties for courts trying to apply the mosaic theory: if the technological
facts of the mosaic change quickly over time, any effort to answer the many
difficult questions raised by the mosaic theory will become quickly outdat-
ed. Courts eventually may devise answers to the many questions discussed
in Part III. But by the time they do, the technology is likely to be obsolete.
202. The closest any scholar has come to answering the questions raised by the mosaic
theory is Christopher Slobogin, who recently proposed a model statute to implement the mo-
saic theory. See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of Jones v. United States in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=2098002. Professor Slobogin proposes a complex framework distinguishing among "target
public searches," "targeted data search of data held by an institutional third party," and "gen-
eral public and data searches." He would require different standards to conduct different kinds
of surveillance for different times, such as twenty minutes or forty-eight hours. See id. at 17-
22. Importantly, even Professor Slobogin declines to say how the mosaic theory applies. His
proposal is statutory rather than constitutional. Further, Professor Slobogin's statutory pro-
posal is similar to arguments he advanced in a recent book on the Fourth Amendment
published well before Jones. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW Gov-
ERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007)). I reviewed Professor
Slobogin's book in 2009, and my critique of his approach then largely responds to his current
proposal. See Orin S. Kerr, Review, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MIcIl. L.
REV. 951 (2009).
203. See I Love Lucy: Job Switching (CBS television broadcast Sept. 15, 1952).
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2. Probabilistic Approaches to the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
Are Ill Suited to Regulate Technological Surveillance
The second problem with the mosaic theory is that most formulations
are based on a probabilistic approach to the reasonable expectation of priva-
cy test that proves ill suited to regulate technological surveillance practices.
Supreme Court decisions have used several different inquiries to determine
what makes an expectation of privacy constitutionally reasonable.2°4 In some
cases, the Court has looked to what a reasonable person would perceive as
likely; 15 in other cases, the Court has looked to whether the particular kind
of information obtained is worthy of protection; 206 in some cases, the Court
has looked to whether the government violated some legal norm such as a
property right in obtaining the information; 207 and in other cases, the Court
has simply considered whether the conduct should be regulated by the
Fourth Amendment as a matter of policy.208 Use of these multiple inquiries
(what I have called "models") of Fourth Amendment protection allows the
Court to adopt different approaches in different contexts, ideally selecting
the model that best identifies the need for regulation in that particular set-
ting.2
01
For the most part, formulations of the mosaic theory rest on the first of
these approaches-what a reasonable person would see as likely. I have
called this the probabilistic approach to Fourth Amendment protection, 210 as
it rests on a notion of the probability of privacy protection. The more likely
it is that a person will maintain their privacy, the more likely it is that gov-
ernment conduct defeating that expectation counts as a search. Under this
model, the Fourth Amendment guards against surprises. The paradigmatic
example is Bond v. United States, 2 1 which involved government agents
physically manipulating a bus passenger's duffel bag to identify a wrapped
brick of drugs inside it. Manipulating the bag violated a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because a bus passenger expects other passengers to handle
his bag but not to "feel the bag in an exploratory manner."2" 2 Both Judge
Ginsburg and Justice Alito authored mosaic opinions that rely on such prob-
abilistic reasoning.213 Judge Ginsburg deemed long-term GPS monitoring a
search because no stranger could conduct the same level of monitoring as a
GPS device. Justice Alito reached the same result on the grounds that a rea-
204. See Kerr, supra note 90.
205. See id. at 508-12.
206. See id. at 512-15.
207. See id. at 516-19.
208. See id. at 519-22.
209. See id. at 543-48.
210. See id. at 508-12.
211. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
212. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
213. See supra Section ll.B.
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sonable person would not expect the police to obtain so much infor-
mation.
21 4
The probabilistic approach is a poor choice to regulate technological
surveillance, however. The problem is a practical one. Most individuals lack
a reliable way to gauge the likelihood of technological surveillance meth-
ods. The probabilistic expectation of privacy applied in Bond relied on
widespread and repeated personal experience. Bus passengers learn the so-
cial practices of bus travel by observing it firsthand. In contrast, estimating
the frequency of technological surveillance practices is essentially impossi-
ble for most people (including most judges). Surveillance practices tend to
be hidden, and few understand the relevant technologies. Some people will
guess that privacy invasions are common. Others will guess that they are
rare. But exceedingly few will know the truth, which makes probabilistic
beliefs a poor basis for Fourth Amendment protection.
Consider the so-called "CSI effect,' 21 5 by which jurors in routine crimi-
nal cases expect prosecutors to introduce evidence collected using high-tech
investigatory tools like those featured on popular television dramas such as
Law & Order and CSI. The CSI effect suggests that members of the public
derive their expectations of police practices in large part from entertaining
but largely fictional television shows. Resting Fourth Amendment doctrine
on such malleable expectations seems a curious choice. A hit show featuring
hardworking officers with high-tech tools could cut back Fourth Amend-
ment protection by suggesting that very invasive investigations are
commonplace. On the other hand, a new show featuring lazy or incompetent
officers might expand Fourth Amendment protection by making particularly
thorough investigations exceed societal expectations. It is hard to see why
such poorly informed beliefs should shape Fourth Amendment protections.
Nor does Supreme Court doctrine require such a result. To the contrary,
the Supreme Court has generally avoided applying the probabilistic model
to government surveillance practices.2"6 The Court has relied instead on oth-
er models that provide more stable ways to regulate government
surveillance practices.21 7 Courts should follow that lead, continuing to focus
on the models of the reasonable expectation of privacy test that do not rely
on probabilistic reasoning.
214. See supra Section H.C.
215. See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSI Effect' Effect:
Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1335, 1336-37 (2009).
216. See United States v. Sparks, 750 E Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010) ("Rather
than using a probabilistic approach to determine reasonable expectations of privacy, in the
context of governmental use of new technologies, the Supreme Court repeatedly has focused





3. The Mosaic Theory Could Interfere with More Effective
Statutory Protections
A third difficulty with the mosaic theory is that it may interfere with the
development of statutory privacy laws. As I have explained in another arti-
cle 2 1 -and as Justice Alito suggested in his concurring opinion in
Jones 219-- Congress has significant institutional advantages over the courts
in trying to regulate privacy in new technologies. Congress can act quickly,
hold hearings, and consider expert opinion.220 Congress can draw arbitrary
lines that don't fit easily within constitutional doctrine.2 21 And if Congress errs
or facts change, Congress can amend its prior handiwork relatively easily.
222
Congress can also regulate using sunset provisions that force the legislature
to revisit the question in light of intervening experience. 23 For these rea-
sons, legislative privacy laws have considerable institutional advantages
over the products of the comparatively slow and less-informed judicial pro-
cess.
The mosaic approach could interfere with statutory solutions in two
ways. First, the theory might discourage legislative action by fostering a
sense that the courts have occupied the field. 224 When courts hear a contro-
versial privacy case but rule that the Fourth Amendment does not apply, the
judicial "no" identifies a problem for the legislature to address. The absence
of judicial regulation invites legislative action. Prominent examples include
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,225 passed in response to United
States v. Miller;226 the Pen Register Statute, 227 passed in response to Smith v.
Maryland;228 and the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,229 passed in response
to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.30 In all three instances, Congress responded to
a Fourth Amendment ruling allowing a controversial investigatory practice
218. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 855-57 (2004).
219. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Kerr, supra note 90, at 805-06).
220. Kerr, supra note 90, at 870, 881-82.
221. See id. at 871-72.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 873.
224. Cf id. at 855-57.
225. Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697-710 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-3422 (2006)).
226. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
227. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, sec. 301(a), 100
Stat. 1848, 1868-72 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
228. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
229. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa,
2000aa-5 to 2000aa-7, 2000aa-1 1 (2006)).
230. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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by creating statutory protections. 23' The possibility of mosaic protection
complicates the legislative picture because mosaic protections can overlap
with possible statutory solutions and therefore render the case for statutory
protection much less apparent.
2 32
The two concurring opinions in Jones can be read as hinting at another
possible interaction between the mosaic theory and statutory protections:
perhaps the mosaic theory operates only where no statutory protection ex-
ists, such that enactment of statutory protections disables the mosaic
theory.23 3 If so, the mosaic theory could encourage statutory protections
rather than discourage them. But this possibility raises its own complex set
of puzzles. For example, how many statutory protections suffice? At the
time of Jones, a few state legislatures had already enacted GPS privacy
231. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
9273, 9306 (discussing bills to create statutory right to privacy in financial records in response
to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435).
232. This is just a prediction, of course, and the novelty of the mosaic approach makes it
difficult to prove. One very modest piece of evidence might be the congressional action on
location privacy before and after Jones. In the months leading up to the Jones decision, several
prominent bills were introduced in Congress to regulate GPS surveillance. In June 2011, Sena-
tors Franken and Blumenthal introduced the Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223,
112th Cong. (2011), and Senator Wyden introduced the Geolocational Privacy and Surveil-
lance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011). In the months following Jones, however, those bills
appear to be stalled, and no other bills have been introduced to date. Of course, one cannot
draw much in the way of conclusions from such sparse evidence.
233. It is important to avoid reading too much into the penumbras of Supreme Court
opinions. Such overreading can purport to find signals that no justice intended. With that said,
Justice Alito introduces his mosaic solution in Jones by explaining that it is "[t]he best that we
can do" in light of the fact that "to date... Congress and most States have not enacted statutes
regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes." United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). This statement could
be interpreted in two ways. On one hand, perhaps it merely means that Justice Alito had to
apply the Fourth Amendment because no statutes exist that could allow the Court to decide the
legality of the government's conduct without reaching the constitutional question. Under this
interpretation, the "best that we can do" language merely reflects the principle of constitution-
al avoidance.
On the other hand, perhaps the "best that we can do" language means that the existence
of privacy statutes disables the mosaic approach, or at least the possibility of an exclusionary
remedy. Cf Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342, 349-50 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply when an officer reasonably relies on a statute authorizing investigatory
conduct later ruled in violation of the Fourth Amendment). This latter interpretation is bolstered
somewhat by the fact that even the widespread adoption of GPS statutes likely would not provide
a basis for constitutional avoidance in Jones, at least outside the context of Krull's good-faith
exception. The federal agents in Jones would not be bound by a state GPS surveillance statute
under the Supremacy Clause, and even a federal privacy statute could only resolve the Jones
case to the extent it included a statutory suppression remedy.
Justice Sotomayor makes a somewhat similar suggestion in her statement that in apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment, she would "consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the
Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to mis-
use." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). This seems to suggest that oversight




laws.234 A few state supreme courts had regulated GPS monitoring under
state constitutions.3 5 More states and the federal government were likely to
enact such protections in the future. If protections outside the Fourth
Amendment end the need for Fourth Amendment protection, how many
statutes and state constitutional decisions must be enacted before they are
sufficient?
A related puzzle is how much protection such statutes must provide. If
any statutory protection disables the mosaic, then legislatures can enact the
most modest and toothless protection and that will suffice. The mosaic threat
would be entirely procedural: legislatures would only need to check the box of
establishing statutory protection to avoid a judicially enforced mosaic. On the
other hand, if courts have to assess whether the statutes are sufficiently
protective to address the kind of concerns that the mosaic theory address-
es, then achieving that standard will be extremely difficult. For reasons I
have explained in depth elsewhere, facial review of privacy statutes to de-
termine if they are sufficiently protective to satisfy a general Fourth
Amendment standard would trigger its own rather daunting interpretive
challenges.
23 6
C. The Mosaic Theory as a Halfvay Measure and the Katz Example
Rejecting the mosaic theory does not mean that judges must sit idly by
as advancing technology diminishes the role of the Fourth Amendment. Un-
der the sequential approach, judges can engage in equilibrium-adjustment
within the context of a binary choice. Judges can rule that government con-
duct is not a search and thereby leave it to statutory regulation, or they can
decide it is a search and subject it to constitutional regulation. Rejecting the
mosaic theory allows this process to continue. It simply leaves out the mosa-
ic theory's effort to introduce a middle-ground third option that amounts to
an awkward halfway measure.
The mosaic theory provides a halfway measure because it leaves sequen-
tial precedents partially in place. It leaves practices unregulated in some
unspecified short-term contexts, and it then flips the switch and calls the
government action a search when grouped together in some broader or long-
er-term contexts. Consider the use of GPS devices in Maynard/Jones. In
United States v. Knotts, the Court had held that use of a location device to
monitor the location of a car on public thoroughfares was never a search.
237
In his mosaic concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito reaffirmed the Knotts prec-
edent but limited it to "relatively short-term monitoring of a person's
234. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.37 (West 2009).
235. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 263-64 (Wash. 2003).
236. See Orin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A Response To
Professor Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 779, 787-90 (2005).
237. 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
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movements on public streets. 238 Under this approach, Knotts was still good
law-at least up to a point, Justice Alito's mosaic opinion offered an at-
tempted middle ground between retaining Knotts in its entirety or simply
overturning it.
Although renouncing the mosaic theory would eliminate this
middle ground, it would allow judges to continue to engage in equilibrium-
adjustment by expanding what constitutes a search. The proper model is
Katz v. United States,239 perhaps the most famous of all Fourth Amendment
decisions. Katz expanded the scope of what constitutes a search by replacing
the constitutionally protected area formulation with something broader.
Under Katz, bugging and wiretapping that had been beyond Fourth
Amendment protection were brought inside that protection to account for
the new world of telephone communications. Notably, the Katz Court did
not say that short-term bugging was permitted but that long-term bugging
became a search at some unspecified point. Instead, the Court followed the
traditional sequential approach by holding that all bugging of a phone while
it was in a person's private use triggered the Fourth Amendment.240
Application of the same method to the use of relatively new surveillance
techniques such as GPS surveillance suggests that the Court should choose
between two basic options. If technology and social practices remain suffi-
ciently stable and the Knotts/Karo line properly balances law enforcement
power and privacy rights, then courts should adhere to those cases. On the
other hand, if changing technology and social practice dramatically expands
government power under Knotts/Karo, courts can engage in equilibrium-
adjustment and overturn Knotts. Courts should follow the Katz example and
engage in equilibrium-adjustment within the confines of the sequential ap-
proach.
CONCLUSION
The concurring opinions in Jones invite lower courts to experiment with
a new approach to the Fourth Amendment search doctrine. The approach is
well intentioned. It aims to restore the balance of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection by disabling the new powers created by computerization of
surveillance tools. But despite these good intentions, the mosaic theory
represents a Pandora's Box that courts should leave closed. The theory rais-
es so many novel and difficult questions that courts would struggle to
provide reasonably coherent answers. By the time courts worked through
answers for any one technology, the technology would likely be long obso-
lete. Mosaic protection also could come at a cost of lost statutory
protections, and implementing it would require courts to assess probabilities
of surveillance that judges are poorly equipped to evaluate. The concurring
238. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
239. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
240. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359.
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opinions in Jones represent an invitation that future courts should decline.
Instead of adopting a new mosaic theory, courts should consider the need to
engage in equilibrium-adjustment within the confines of the traditional se-
quential approach.
